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Highlights
• Raising public awareness and trust in transmission infrastructure 
development is one of the key current challenges facing Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs) and other project developers. The result can 
be costly delays.
• Fine-tuning the regulatory toolbox that National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) apply to incentivise TSOs can be part of the solution. The toolbox 
consists of cost-plus or rate of return regulation, price or revenue cap 
regulation, and output regulation. 
• Each of these tools has strengths and limitations in terms of biases. In this 
brief, we identify the biases that are specific to stakeholder engagement 
activities that TSOs undertake to increase the public awareness and trust. 
• Under the cost-plus approach, NRAs are biased towards the least 
controversial activity. Thus, the TSOs will try to anticipate the costs 
that will be more easily approved by the regulator. However, these least 
controversial activities may not be the most effective.
• Under the price/revenue cap, TSOs can be biased towards prioritising 
activities that result in the highest direct improvement of cost efficiency. 
They can also be biased in selecting the least controversial activities 
rather than the most cost-effective ones, simply because it can adversely 
affect their reputation and their engagement with the regulator.
• Under output regulation, independent experts can help the regulator to 
assess and challenge the stakeholder engagement activities undertaken by 
a TSO. This approach, however, requires a higher level of sophistication 
and complexity so that it can only be managed properly by a regulatory 
agency with sufficient resources and skills.
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1. Introduction1 
Raising public awareness and trust in transmission 
infrastructure development is one of the key current 
challenges faced by project developers. In recent 
times, the affected public is becoming increasingly 
aware of and participative in the project develop-
ment process. Therefore, project developers need 
to be innovative and to go beyond their traditional 
approaches to stakeholder engagement. 
One of the key factors for encouraging project 
developers to apply innovative stakeholder engage-
ment activities is the financial incentive attached to 
these activities. Since the liberalisation of the power 
sector, the use of ‘incentive regulation’ has become 
a standard practice among European regulators for 
effective and efficient implementation of grid tasks. 
The most commonly used incentive regulation tools 
in Europe are: cost-plus regulation (15 countries), 
price or revenue cap regulation (20 countries), and 
output-based regulation in three instances namely, 
Great Britain, Italy and Belgium. In these three 
countries, the regulatory frameworks for the trans-
mission level have some elements to reward perfor-
mance based on output proxies. In some countries 
such as France amongst others, a combination with 
a price cap for opex and cost-plus for capex has also 
been applied. Table 1 illustrates the current incentive 
regulation practices applied in Europe. 
 Table 1: current practice of incentive regulation 
(based on ACER Recommendation 2014/032  and 
own research) 
1.  Also see the FSR report: Bhagwat, P. C., Keyaerts, N., and Meeus L., 2018. Enlarging incentive regulation to improve public 
awareness and trust in electricity transmission infrastructure development. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/54884
2. ACER, 2014. Recommendation of the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators No 03/2014 on incentives for projects of 
common interest and on a common methodology for risk evaluation. Ljubljana.
Each incentive regulation tool has its strengths but 
also inherent biases when applied for stakeholder 
engagement that TSOs undertake to increase the 
public awareness and trust. Depending upon the tool 
applied, NRAs and the project developers can lean 
towards using one particular stakeholder engage-
ment activity or another regardless of whether it 
is the most effective approach for raising public 
acceptance and trust. An important aspect is a bias 
that can arise in the decision-making process due to 
the degree of controversy attached to each level of 
stakeholder engagement, discussed below. 
Project-level stakeholder engagement activities aim 
at creating goodwill for specific projects. Examples 
of such activities include local dialogue forums, 
stakeholder workshops etc. TSOs widely adopt such 
activities, which are seen as project development 
costs. A few stakeholder interactions are even man-
datory by law, e.g. organising a public consultation. 
Thus, the costs of such activities have a low level of 
controversy. 
Corporate level stakeholder engagement aims at 
improving the goodwill of stakeholders towards 
the whole business organisation. Examples of such 
engagement are corporate social activities, educa-
tional campaigns, advertisement, and sponsoring. 
The costs of such activities raise significantly more 
controversy than project-level stakeholder costs. 
The root of the controversy lies in the debate over 
Cost-plus / Rate-of-return (15) Price/Revenue cap (20) Output based (3)
AT, BE (capex), BG, HR, CY, CZ 
(capex), DK, FR (capex), GR, IT 
(capex), LV, MT, PO (capex), PT 
(capex), ES
BE (opex), CZ (opex), EE, FI, FR 
(opex), DE, GB, HU, IE, IT (opex), 
LT, LU, NL, NO, PO (opex), PT 
(opex), RO, SK, SI, SE
GB (some elements), IT (some ele-
ments), BE (some elements, since 
2017)
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the need for a natural monopoly with a regulated 
income to spend money on activities to build a cor-
porate reputation. On the one hand, it can be argued 
that such activities do not add any value in terms 
of the increase in quantifiable benefit. On the other 
hand, a positive image may be useful for improving 
public support during the execution of new trans-
mission expansion projects. 
Compensations are a way to mitigate negative exter-
nalities of a project. A common example is of com-
pensating landowners who suffer a reduction in the 
value of their land. These costs are the most contro-
versial among the three engagement levels. Not all 
TSOs have a mandate to make decisions regarding 
payments of compensation. For some TSOs, the 
quantity of money that can be spent on compensa-
tion is strictly regulated. Eventually, all consumers 
pay the cost of compensation. Therefore, it entails a 
significant reallocation of welfare from society as a 
whole, towards a set of selected parties. A degree of 
subjectivity is involved in assessing the purpose of 
such a transfer of wealth, even when it is done within 
the legal boundaries.
These biases have the potential to hamper the effec-
tive implementation of these tools. In this policy 
brief, we illustrate the biases in cost-plus regulation, 
price or revenue cap regulation, and output-based 
regulation.
2. Incentives and Biases Under Cost-Plus 
Regulation 
In a cost-plus approach, the regulator is responsible 
for ascertaining the efficiently incurred costs of the 
TSO. In the cost-plus approach, the decision on the 
choice and level of stakeholder engagement that is to 
be incentivised lies with the NRA. The regulator can 
incentivise TSOs to engage in effective and innova-
tive stakeholder engagement activities to raise public 
acceptance and trust by allowing the TSO to recoup 
the cost of such activities. Therefore, an inherent 
incentive for innovation in stakeholder engagement 
is observed under a cost-plus regime. 
However, on the other hand, the NRA can have a 
bias towards implementing the least controversial 
activities while deciding upon the costs from stake-
holder engagement that the firm may recover. Con-
sequently, the TSOs will try to anticipate the costs 
that will be more easily approved by the regulator. 
Therefore, there would be a bias towards giving pro-
ject-level activities priority over company level and 
compensation activities. However, these least con-
troversial activities may not be the most effective in 
achieving the said goal. 
3. Incentives and Biases Under Price-Cap 
Regulation 
In a price/revenue cap regime the firm is incentiv-
ised to improve its efficiency by reducing the costs 
over this period to maximise its profit. This regu-
latory framework is most effective in the case that 
the TSO activities improve the cost efficiency of the 
TSO. Consequently, the TSO can earn more profit 
within the regulatory period. Such a regime provides 
an intrinsic incentive for the TSO to innovate and 
participate in more stakeholder engagement activi-
ties, which have the potential to improve cost effi-
ciency. 
A good example of a stakeholder engagement activity 
that TSOs are financially incentivised to undertake 
under the price/revenue cap regime is one that helps 
them to reduce their maintenance cost, like in the 
Life ELIA-RTE project. The project applied innova-
tive vegetation management techniques to create eco-
logical corridors along the routes of the high voltage 
lines in the forests of Belgium and France. The pro-
ject involves project-level stakeholder engagement 
in the form a co-creation by the TSOs and the NGO 
to innovate the vegetation management of the TSOs. 
The project was co-financed by the European Com-
mission, the Walloon Regional government, Elia and 
RTE to varying degrees. 
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A cost-benefit analysis was conducted to assess 
the impact of this project in 2015.3 The analysis 
compared the innovative vegetation management 
methods used in the project with traditional veg-
etation management being implemented by ELIA 
in Belgium. The innovative vegetation management 
method leads to a significantly shorter time for costs 
to break even, between 3 to 9 years. Furthermore, it 
would be 1.4 to 3.9 times cheaper compared to tra-
ditional rotary milling. These cost savings would be 
directly captured by the TSO within the regulatory 
period under a price/revenue cap regime.
The analysis claims that the ELIA-LIFE approach 
would improve the societal acceptability of TSOs 
and build trust with concerned stakeholders, facili-
tate permitting, construction and renovation of 
overhead lines. Finally, the project also integrates 
European legislation such as Natura 2000 and sim-
ilar directives.
In a price/revenue cap approach, firstly, TSOs will 
be biased towards prioritising activities that result 
in the highest direct improvement of cost effi-
ciency. However, there will be a tendency to ignore 
stakeholder engagement activities that increase the 
overall benefit from the project without reflecting on 
the operational bottom-line of the TSO. Secondly, 
a price/revenue cap approach allows the TSOs to 
choose the type and combination of stakeholder 
engagement that they wish to apply. The company 
may have a bias towards using the least controver-
sial level of stakeholder engagement from the three 
levels discussed in the previous section.
3.  LIFE Elia-RTE and Elia, 2015. A cost-benefit analysis of an alternative vegetation management.
4.  For more information refer to OFGEM, 2012. RIIO-T1: Final Proposals for National Grid Electricity Transmission and 
National Grid Gas. London.
5.  For more details please refer to Keyaerts, N., Meeus, L., 2017. The regulatory experience of Italy and the United States with 
dedicated incentives for strategic electricity transmission investment. Util. Policy 46, 71–80. doi:10.1016/j.jup.2017.04.005
6.  For more details on this please refer to Elia Annual Report 2016. Brussels.
4. Incentives and Biases Under Output 
Regulation 
The choice for output regulation is a very attractive 
option if there is an availability of a credible and 
robust proxy to measure the output performance of 
the TSO. The regulator can set targeted incentives for 
enabling TSOs to undertake high-quality and inno-
vative stakeholder engagement activities such as in 
Great Britain where a targeted incentive, amounting 
to 0.5% of their annual allowed revenues, was pro-
vided for encouraging high-quality stakeholder 
engagement activities4. A panel of independent 
experts is appointed by OFGEM to assess the activi-
ties of the TSO and to allocate the reward. Such an 
approach allows the NRA to ensure stakeholder 
engagement by incentivising such activities specifi-
cally. Another innovative practice is of appointing 
external experts for assessing the stakeholder activi-
ties thus mitigating issues arising from the need for 
greater regulatory abilities for administering a com-
plex incentive regulatory approach.
Alternately a more general incentive can be provided, 
as is the case in Belgium and Italy. During Italy’s 
fourth regulatory period (2012-2015), a premium 
remuneration was provided for the TSOs that were 
able to meet predefined implementation timelines. 
The approach consisted of three types of incentives: 
a premium return on investment for completed pro-
jects; a premium for work in progress; and, a penalty 
for projects exceeding their planned commissioning 
date5. Similarly, in Belgium, there are dedicated 
incentives for ‘strategic investment projects’. These 
mainly consist of additional remuneration for the 
project that is linked to the timely completion6.
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Two biases are observed in an output regulation 
regime. Firstly, there can be a bias by the TSO 
towards following a ‘mark the marker’ approach. In 
other words, TSOs would do just enough to tick the 
box and cash the premiums. Furthermore, stake-
holder engagement activities that reflect well on the 
KPIs would be preferred. The second bias can be 
introduced when independent experts are involved 
in the assessment. Although these experts are 
expected to be unbiased (low bias) in their assess-
ment, the approach is influenced by the ability of the 
experts selected by the TSO. Thus, the preference of 
the expert may reflect upon the allocation of incen-
tives for different stakeholder engagement activities 
conducted by the TSO.
5. Summary
This policy brief illustrates the inherent implementa-
tion biases existing in incentive regulation that can 
hamper the effective implementation of the stake-
holder engagement activities that are needed to 
increase the public awareness and trust in transmis-
sion infrastructure projects. Figure 1 summarises 
the identified biases within each incentive regula-
tion tool examined. NRAs should ensure that these 
identified biases are minimised to enable greater and 
more innovative stakeholder engagement.
Figure 1: Summary of biases within each incentive regulation tool.
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